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mediate decision making and further information 
processing takes place. If different populations of 
neurons, corresponding to different representa-
tions, are modulated by attention at the same fre-
quency range, they enter into a state of resonance. 
Therefore, in Prinz's perspective, the unity of con-
sciousness is considered as deriving from atten-
tional resonance.  
The relationship between the psychological 
characterization of conscious states as Attended In-
termediate-Level Representations, and their neural 
correlates is also investigated with promising results. 
In fact, one of the core problems in the debate about 
mind/brain states results from the fact that a physi-
calist is committed to ascribing causal capability ex-
clusively to the physical level, leaving aside the psy-
chological level as ultimately irrelevant.  
To avoid this epiphenomenalist consequence, 
Prinz advances a new position, which he calls Neu-
rofunctionalism: «A mental state is neurofunctional 
if […] its being the state that it is depends on its 
psychological role and its neural implementation 
[…] these levels are not only jointly required, but 
also interdependent. Function depends on realizers 
and conversely» (p. 286).  
Conscious mental states are then neurofunc-
tional states, which means that they are identified 
equally as their brain correlates and by virtue of 
their functional role in consciousness. The experi-
ence of a color is at the same time a particular pat-
tern of activity in one or more populations of neu-
rons and a representation of an environmental fea-
ture, associated in the brain with behavioral reac-
tions, emotional response and other features, all of 
which constitute the scope and the subjective func-
tion, or aim, of consciousness. 
The last and most difficult metaphysical puzzle 
addressed in the book concerns phenomenal 
knowledge. The notorious problem is that, when 
we have a particular phenomenal experience, we 
possibly acquire a kind of knowledge related to the 
experience we are having: we learn “what it is like” 
to have that experience.  
This particular knowledge, if it is knowledge, is 
indeed, for the involved subject, not derivable from 
the sum of the possible physical information that the 
subject can obtain; thus, there appears to be some-
thing, regarding phenomenal states, which is not 
physical. But Prinz claims that the argument is mis-
leading, insofar as there is nothing mysterious, and 
moreover nothing not physical, in the enhancement 
of actual knowledge that being in a particular phe-
nomenal state provides to the subject itself.  
Phenomenal knowledge is, in this perspective, 
obtainable through further inner information pro-
cessing. When a phenomenal state becomes con-
scious, this means that it has been selected by atten-
tion to be possibly encoded in working memory, 
but it is not immediately encoded. When, at a fol-
lowing stage, it is encoded (and maintained) in 
working memory, it becomes available for further 
processing, and a new form of knowledge can be 
extrapolated from this condition.  
This explains why a subject needs to be in a 
state in order to know what its like to be in that 
state, without appealing to anything beyond the 
physical world. 
In the conclusion to his book, Prinz closes the cir-
cle by showing how the AIR theory he has been pro-
posing can match every single desideratum identified 
in the first chapter. And the complex of his work does 
leave an impression of thorough, wide-angled analyses 
of most of the different positions available.  
Starting from a sustained criticism of the vari-
ous problematic aspects of previous theories and 
research, Prinz formulates an essential, consistent 
and straightforward theory of consciousness. More 
than that, he argues for his position both at a psy-
chological level of description and from a neuro-
biologically consistent perspective.  
Many of the topics in the book, as well as the 
analyses of the relevant data and experiments, are 
highly technical and complex, but the Author’s flu-
ent style, along with the many examples he provides, 
“facilitate” an understanding and appreciation of his 
work. Some of the positions proposed by this book 
may appear somehow radical, but they have the mer-
it of always remaining coherent with both the theo-
retical background and the available data, and are 
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Over the last few decades, the philosophy of 
mind has faced many challenging questions about its 
own methodology: in particular, the so-called prob-
lem of naturalization has given rise to a complex de-
bate on the role of philosophy in elaborating, among 
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other things, scientific models for the philosophy of 
mind and the neurosciences themselves.  
In his book Coscienza [Consciousness], Pietro 
Perconti provides a thoughtful analysis of the state 
of the art in consciousness theories. In a brilliantly, 
clearly written commentary, he illustrates both the 
methodological challenges to philosophical research 
and the different ways in which philosophy and the 
sciences have approached the topic of consciousness. 
In the first chapter, Il lato evanescente della mente 
[The evanescent aspect of mind], he starts quoting the 
psychologist Susan Blackmore. In her opinion, an 
improved scientific comprehension of consciousness 
will soon make philosophical questions about the 
mind obsolete, just as problems regarding the élan 
vital simply disappeared with the advent of contem-
porary biology: it is time, once again, for philoso-
phers to step aside. 
But, according to Perconti, Blackmore’s claim fac-
es at least two problems. Firstly, it is not clear at all 
whether the cognitive sciences are comparable with a 
discipline like biology. The cognitive sciences are not 
(in Kuhn’s terminology) a “normal” science. It is still 
controversial whether the scientific procedures adopt-
ed by researchers are methodologically reliable.  
An example: using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging we can observe a correlation between brain 
activity and certain introspective reports. But it is not 
clear whether this correlation between brain activity 
and the content of an introspective report can be used 
to explain the latter by invoking the former as cause or 
ground (such an approach is sometimes ironically 
called “voodoo correlation method”).  
The second problem with Blackmore’s claim is 
that researchers disagree about the nature of mental 
phenomena. Ned Block distinguishes between two 
fundamental components of consciousness: access 
and phenomenal consciousness.  
Is it possible – Perconti asks – to formulate a rig-
orous scientific theory even with respect to phenom-
enal aspects of consciousness? Answering this ques-
tion raises deep epistemological problems about the 
nature of qualia, i.e. about a crucial aspect of the 
“evanescent nature of mind”.  
In light of these objections, it seems a foregone 
conclusion that philosophy must play at the very 
least a normative role by regulating the process of 
the “naturalization” of mind.  
Perconti focuses on a topic which has been per-
vasive from the time of the ancient Greek philoso-
phers up to the Scholastic thinkers (including 
Thomas Aquinas), that is, the close relation between 
consciousness, freedom and moral responsibility. In 
Perconti’s opinion, this relation should, and could, be 
better examined in the light of recent developments 
in the philosophy of mind: moving from the twofold 
meaning of the word “consciousness” (“be aware” 
and “be responsible”), he asks whether our freedom 
depends on the fact that we have consciousness (or 
vice versa).  
Perconti partly follows Dennett’s approach in re-
gard to the well-known dispute on the realism on 
mental states, thus enlightening in an interesting way 
a key methodological point: it is better to focus on 
the rules for the attribution of freedom, instead of 
analyzing the concept of freedom from an ontologi-
cal point of view. In other words, it is better to exam-
ine why we consider persons free, instead of directly 
asking whether freedom exists or what “freedom” 
means.  
According to the author, this approach is likely 
to lead to a far more suitable analysis of free will, also 
connected to a better analysis of consciousness. 
Moreover, Perconti introduces the so-called 
“Cartesian  mind-body problem”. Showing the influ-
ence of Descartes in cognitive science, he underlines 
his role as a philosophical ace as well as a worthy en-
emy: on the one hand, Noam Chomsky (see N. 
Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics. A Chapter in the 
History of Rationalist Thought, Harper & Row, New 
York-London 1966) owes to Descartes the basis for 
his idea of linguistic innatism.  
On the other, the work of Antonio Damasio (see 
A. Damasio, Descartes’ Error. Emotions, Reason and 
the Human Brain, Avon Books, New York 1994) and 
Martha Nussbaum (M. Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2001) reveals a weak 
point in Cartesian thought: pace Descartes, emotions 
do play a key role even in our rational choices.  
From this point of view, the rigid Cartesian di-
chotomy between emotions and reason must col-
lapse under the cognitive inquiry itself – maybe also 
bringing to an end the much-debated Cartesian con-
sideration of non-human animals as mere brutes. 
Moving from the Cartesian idea of an incorpore-
al, conscious “strong self”, in the fourth chapter 
Perconti also takes into consideration the stimulat-
ing philosophical problem of personal identity. He 
gives an exhaustive overview of the debate on per-
sonal identity starting from John Locke and his 
“mnemonic” account.  
Locke’s motto is “no person without conscious-




to be a person. This merely intuitive idea was effec-
tively criticized in various ways from the very begin-
ning (Thomas Reid, Joseph Buttler and so on and so 
forth). As Perconti further correctly remarks, follow-
ing David Hume contemporary psychological ac-
counts of personal identity do not consider con-
sciousness as a necessary and sufficient criterion of 
identity – see, in particular, the work of Derek Parfit, 
who rejects the very possibility that     something like 
a “Cartesian Ego” could exist at all. 
Furthermore, Perconti provides a quick over-
view of what we could call a “skeptical standpoint”: 
many philosophers, including Wittgenstein, Ryle, 
Russell and Quine, have convincingly raised the sus-
picion that questions about the nature of conscious-
ness are something of a red herring.  
For example, in view of his philosophical behav-
iorism, Ryle rejected any explanation of observable 
behavior in terms of mental states. He considered 
consciousness to be an ontological myth. Underscor-
ing instead a supposed methodological problem, the 
psychological version of behaviorism proposed by 
John Watson refutes the possibility of studying con-
sciousness within a naturalistic framework.  
Perconti also quotes Steven Pinker’s and Colin 
McGinn’s claims that consciousness is not simply a 
problem, but rather a mystery. Nevertheless, some 
philosophers seem to embrace a more optimistic 
point of view. John Searle, for instance, holds that 
consciousness is a natural phenomenon, which pre-
sents some clear distinguishing features. 
Endorsing this position, Perconti claims that the 
main features of consciousness are its personal, per-
spectival, unitary, phenomenal, representational, 
emotional, useful and moral nature. After this char-
acterization, he leads the reader to the heart of some 
hard problems, the first of which concerns the rela-
tion between consciousness and language. He de-
scribes the famous experiments which the Nobel 
Laureate Roger Sperry carried out on so-called “split 
brain” patients.  
These experiments crucially revealed that an es-
sential level of consciousness exists and that it does 
not require language skills. Nevertheless, it seems 
that human beings – Perconti stresses – cannot ex-
hibit responsible behavior until they develop the ca-
pacity to entertain Lewisian “de se beliefs”. 
Someone might also wonder whether language is 
necessary for self-awareness. In Ernst Tugendhat’s 
view, the answer is yes. But what exactly is self-
awareness? Developing on what is an essentially so-
cial theory of self-consciousness as self-awareness 
presented in his book L'autocoscienza (see P. Percon-
ti, L'autocoscienza, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2008), 
Perconti draws a distinction between two different 
components of self-awareness: on the one hand, we 
can observe self-recognition phenomena. On the oth-
er, we can distinguish reflexive reasoning phenomena. 
When a cognitive agent recognizes herself in a pic-
ture, we have an example of a self-recognition phe-
nomenon. When a cognitive agent reasons about her 
own life choices, we have an example of a reflexive 
reasoning phenomenon. 
Another problem worth mentioning is the fol-
lowing. Can something like an “artificial conscious-
ness” exist? Taking into account the broad debate on 
so-called “strong AI”, Perconti clearly shows that an-
yone who wants to answer this question has to con-
sider whether a genuine case of artificial phenomenal 
consciousness is possible. 
In recent years there have been many complex 
debates concerning the possibility of a naturalistic 
approach to phenomenal consciousness. A still open 
question is: how can qualia be studied in a scientific 
manner? In the last chapter Perconti tries to answer 
this question by offering an intriguing theory of qua-
lia. He distinguishes between private and public qua-
lia. Someone’s private qualia are sensory experiences 
that depend on both her personal experiences and a 
certain set of intersubjective relationships. By con-
trast, someone’s public qualia are shared with other 
cognitive agents.  
To sum up, in Perconti’s opinion we can only 
study public qualia in an empirical manner, by 
studying how the functional architecture of the 
mind/brain regulates a certain sensory experience. 
His conclusion is that it is possible to investigate at 
least part of phenomenal consciousness using rigor-
ous methods. 
We conclude with a brief remark. Describing the 
famous “Chinese Room” thought experiment, 
Perconti claims that Searle's argument does not 
demonstrate that a full awareness of both syntactic 
rules and semantic content is necessary to be linguis-
tically competent (p. 151). We agree, but – in our 
opinion – the object of Searle’s thought experiment 
is rather to show that a partial awareness of both 
syntactic rules and semantic content is necessary to 
be linguistically competent.  
The cognitive agent in Searle’s experiment seems 
to respond appropriately to verbal stimuli. Neverthe-
less, we think that the agent does not understand 
Chinese because she is not (in Diego Marconi's ter-





cannot be referentially competent without at least a 
partial awareness of semantic content, she can 
doubtless be referentially competent also without a 
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La filosofia è anche le parole in cui essa si esprime. 
Il lessico delle filosofie, il differente utilizzo di termini 
e concetti, dice dunque molto del loro senso. 
Un’analisi approfondita e sistematica del lessico di-
venta particolarmente importante e chiarificatrice del-
le molteplici radici, significati e conseguenze dello spi-
nozismo, di un pensiero che non può essere inteso, 
compreso e ingabbiato in definizioni, schemi, rigidi 
paradigmi ermeneutici e che pur dovendo molto alle 
parole del suo tempo e della tradizione segna però uno 
scarto teoretico che lo rende inassimilabile a qualun-
que scuola, corrente, posizione. 
Tra i meriti di questo libro c’è una ricchissima lista 
di Concordanze – curata da Ada Russo – che consente 
di muoversi agevolmente tra le ricorrenze nelle diverse 
opere dei dodici lemmi presi in considerazione: Ac-
quiescentia, Amor Dei intellectualis, Amor sui, Expe-
rientia, Machina, Mens, Natura, Obedientia, Politica, 
Religio, Signum, Theologia. L’unica voce poco convin-
cente è quella intitolata Signum, che di Spinoza parla 
assai poco dedicando invece gran spazio a Descartes e 
in generale al rapporto tra passione d’amore e disturbi 
somatici nella filosofia e nella medicina del Seicento. 
Per questa ragione, forse sarebbe stato opportuno col-
locare l’analisi di tale lemma in appendice. 
Le altre voci disegnano un percorso lucido e ar-
gomentato dentro la complessità di Spinoza, per il 
quale la “natura” non coincide con la materia, l’essere 
non è la struttura fisico-chimica, atomistica e moleco-
lare del mondo, ma costituisce una funzione d’ordine, 
un legame tra le più disparate forme – i modi – nei 
quali la materia si dà: «il termine natura coincide già 
qui [nel Tractatus de intellectus emendatione] con 
l’ordine eterno, fisso e immutabile, secondo cui ogni 
cosa è scandita e agisce sia su un piano generale sia sul 
piano della serie delle res singulares» (p. 105). In 
quest’ordine naturale, l’umano non può costituire un 
imperium in imperio, ma è una parte dell’intero. Esat-
tamente quella parte in cui l’intero comprende se stes-
so. L’umano, infatti, condivide con ogni ente l’impulso 
a esserci ancora, il conatus sese conservandi, la volontà 
di vivere e sopravvivere, una «cupiditas» che «est 
ipsa hominis essentia» (p. 41, a proposito del lemma 
Amor sui). 
Questa macchina del desiderio ha uno scopo ben 
preciso: la felicità. Uno stato che non ha a che fare con 
«una condizione ancora soggetta all’instabilità delle 
passioni, per assumere il significato di felicità intesa 
come acquisizione per l’uomo del suo più alto grado di 
potenza» (p. 10). La gioia spinoziana non è un ele-
mento psicologico, ma una dimensione metafisica. Ed 
è anche per questo che sulle passioni non pesa 
l’ostinato e innaturale pregiudizio della loro negatività 
e di un superamento che le annulli. Ciò è infatti sem-
plicemente impossibile, poiché le passioni non sono 
dei «vizi da estirpare», ma costituiscono delle «strut-
ture fondamentali e fondanti del dinamismo della no-
stra vita interiore, attraverso cui si manifesta e si 
esprime il nostro sé individuale» (p. 17). 
I loro effetti non dipendono quindi dalla loro na-
tura, ma dalla funzione passiva o attiva che esercitano 
nella vita della mente, frutto di una conoscenza confu-
sa o viceversa adeguata della loro struttura e 
dell’influenza che esercitano sull'esistenza umana. Gli 
affetti possono e debbono essere indagati come un 
elemento tra gli altri della natura, sottoposto alle stesse 
leggi e regole universali che tutta la pervadono e alla 
natura danno ordine. È su tale fondamento che Spino-
za può scrivere: «sedulo curavi, humanas actiones 
non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intellige-
re» (Trattato politico, I, 4; qui a p. 20). 
La possibilità di comprendere le azioni umane, al 
di là dei giudizi del soggetto, affonda anche nella strut-
tura ancora una volta naturale, e quindi legata al tutto, 
della mente. Essa è «idea corporis, non nel senso che la 
mente abbia come contenuto il corpo, ma che mente e 
corpo non si danno come realtà separate in quanto, 
coerentemente con l’impianto metafisico spinoziano, 
essi sono un’unica sostanza la quale si manifesta attra-
verso i due soli attributi attingibili agli uomini, ora 
come estensione ora come pensiero» (pp. 82-83). 
Nessuna separazione, contrapposizione, dualismo o 
confusione. La mente è una funzione molteplice, una 
«articolazione di ragione ed esperienza, dinamismo 
dell’intelletto e della corporeità umani» (p. 98). La 
mente è incarnata e il corpo è funzione che compren-
de. La loro dinamica è un legame simultaneo – questo 
il significato dell’avverbio simul che spesso ricorre in 
Spinoza – il quale assicura la naturalità di ogni moto, 
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